The Signability Dilemma

Posted by Steve Fales | Posted in MLB | Posted: June 10, 2009 at 12:38 pm

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Let me start this article by acknowledging the fact that my proposal is everything that baseball tries to avoid. I understand that baseball has created a system that emphasizes the free-market and lets needs and resources dictate how much a player receives for his services. However, when I look at the current process Major League Baseball teams have to go through, when it comes to signing draft picks, I realize that something’s wrong.

scott-boras-smi2The Amateur Player Draft was introduced, in 1965, to develop a system wherein amateur players are designated to professional teams. In the system, the worst teams (based on record) were granted the first picks, so as to even the playing field over the long-term. It works this way in every major American sport, as you surely know. Baseball prides itself on its blatantly capitalistic market model. Those who want to pay exorbitant amounts of cash to land free agents, for instance, can do so at their own discretion. Those teams who cannot afford such ready-made talent are forced to continually rebuild through the draft. This process has worked fabulously throughout the past several decades, and continues to work well. As research methods improve, drafting and scouting decisions become more calculated, and the weaker teams are prone to make better choices. So the worst teams get the highest-rated players available; everything’s fine, right? Well, no. Before a team gets to sign a player, it has to award him with a ’signing bonus’. For at least two decades, High School players have been able to use college commitments, and ’scholastic ambitions’ as leverage while negotiating for their signing bonuses. For instance,left-handed pitching prospect Troy Patton, out of Tomball HS in Texas, was committed to playing college ball at the University of Texas. Therefore, when the Houston Astros selected him in the 9th round of the 2004 draft, he could ask for more to ‘pry him away’ from attending Texas. The Astros then paid him a $900,000 signing bonus, way over the slot rate for a ninth rounder, to do so.

This is not where my quarrels lie. I have no problem with a player using college as leverage, as it is a natural occurrence that one go to college. In 2005, however, pitcher, Luke Hochevar was selected 11th overall out of the University of Tennessee by the Los Angeles Dodgers. Hochevar and his agent, the much-hated, Scott Boras (seen above), never got close to an agreement with the Dodgers. Hochevar used his off year to play in an independent league with the Fort Worth Cats where he had a performed well in limited time. The following year, Hochevar went 1st overall to the Kansas City Royals, and Hochevar got his bonus. This has created an entirely new avenue for college players to use as leverage while at the negotiating table. Now even college players could have these dreaded ’signability issues’; something that was unheard of 10 years ago.  This has been seen twice in the lukehochevar2past three seasons with Max Scherzer, who turned an Independent League stint into a better bonus, and Aaron Crow, who entered the following year’s draft. Stephen Strasburg, the No. 1 overall pick in yesterdays draft, could now use this as an option when negotiating with the desperately bad, Washington Nationals. Rumors are starting that Boras and Strasburg will be looking for a bonus upwards of $40m and a major league contract. Similar to the deal Japanese pitcher Daisuke Matsuzaka received upon entering the league three years ago. It should be noted that if a ball club does not sign their first round pick, they will get a compensation pick the following year, one pick behind when the player was chosen. (The Nationals received a compensation pick at No. 10 overall this year because of their inability to sign their 2008 first-rounder, Crow, who went No. 9 overall.)

The problem I have with the current system is quite clear. Why should the rules that are in place create an environment where the worst teams in baseball are held for ransom? I understand the argument that the players want to play in the big leagues and they will eventually sign…etc. There is no question that the Nationals have to sign Strasburg. I know that, you know that and, worst of all, Scott Boras knows that. So what happens when a team spends the equivalent of 2/3 of their annual payroll to sign someone who may or may not be a productive MLB player? The system does not need a make-over, it just needs tinkering.

I suggest an alternative solution to this burgeoning problem. One, that a college player can earn no more than 20% higher than the designated slot amount for that pick. Some will complain that this is too regulatory, however if you’ve seen the statistics on signing bonus growth, as well as the likelihood of a draft pick making it to the majors, you will agree that this is a fair adjustment. The second option is to implement a price floor (10% below the slot price, for example.), which the ball club has to exceed in its bonus offer. This will make negotiations far less interesting, however it will secure the talented players’ services for the teams who so badly need them.

This is just my idea, if you guys have any other solutions to this problem, let me know!

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Comments (1)

I think a player should submit what he is willing to play for prior to his selection in the draft. Then the teams will know ahead of time what they will have to pay to sign the player. The commisioner would assign a minimum salary for each slot which would be designed to leep owners from being to cheap. A player would not be allowed to to submit a figure then back out of it or he would be banned from the following years draft.

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